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Commentary
The price of certainty: How the politics of
pandemic data demand an ethics of care
Linnet Taylor
Abstract
The Covid-19 pandemic broke on a world whose grip on epistemic trust was already in disarray. The first months of the
pandemic saw many governments publicly performing reliance on epidemiological and modelling expertise in order to
signal that data would be the basis for justifying whatever population-level measures of control were judged necessary.
But comprehensive data has not become available, and instead scientists, policymakers and the public find themselves in
a situation where policy inputs determine the data available and vice versa. This essay asks how we can live with what
Amoore has termed ‘post-Cartesian doubt’ in situations of existential risk, and what kind of approach to science and
data can answer the moral and human demands of a situation such as the Covid-19 pandemic. I suggest that science and
policy could be able to control the pandemic better by addressing the sources of uncertainty and missing data not as
gaps in the information landscape, but as individuals who are likely to be members of less-visible and less powerful
groups including low-wage workers, the elderly, migrants, prisoners and others. This would shift both data use and
policy toward an ethics of care, an embodied approach which asks what people need and how they behave in relation to
each other, rather than how to manage population-level behaviour. This approach, I argue, is more appropriate for
pandemic response than a utilitarian calculation of how many people each country should expect to lose as a result of
the disease.
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In 2011, historian of science Chunglin Kwa wrote:
Science will never again be the special province of a
governing elite that claims to wield its authority in
the service of culture and progress. Too many people
have gained access to scientific information for there to
be any way back. (Kwa, 2011: 275)
He may have spoken too soon: the Covid-19 pandemic
broke on a world whose grip on epistemic trust (the faith
that information circulating publicly is reliable) (Origgi,
2004) was already in disarray, and where people’s access
to scientific information was being balanced by a chaotic
online information environment that diminished trust in
experts and government alike. The first months of the
pandemic saw many governments publicly performing
reliance on scientific, and specifically epidemiological,
expertise in order to establish that data would be the
basis for justifying whatever population-level measures
of control were judged necessary.
Comprehensive data, however, turned out not to be
forthcoming. Instead irregular eruptions of scientific
insight – such as the revelation that a policy focusing
on controlling the movement of people showing Covid-
19 symptoms will miss somewhere between 40 and 80%
of infectious agents (Day, 2020) or the discovery that a
vaccine may not fully resolve the pandemic due to
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varying degrees of immunity post-infection (Guardian,
2020c) – have failed to illuminate a clear path through
the pandemic, leaving in their wake spaces for very
different judgements on what can, or should, be done
to control the spread of the disease. This irregularity
and inconsistency has exposed epistemological fault
lines in terms of policymakers’ ability to deal with sci-
entific uncertainty and illustrated how data can be used
to perform public clarity of purpose without actually
enabling those in authority to understand what is the
best course of action.
The recent history of datafication has not fostered
humility in the data science community. The Big Data
paradigm (Kitchin, 2014) privileges positivist rhetorics
of objectivity, rationality and certainty which in turn
foster what Jose Van Dijck (2014) has termed ‘dataism’
– a belief that quantification produces truth, combined
with trust in the agents who collect and interpret data.
This paradigm does not align well with the epistemol-
ogies made possible by pandemic data, which arrives in
fits and starts, full of holes, and is shaped by different
national policies on public health and information.
Covid-19, like all crises, has politics: it burrows deep
into the faultlines of inequality, neglect and marginal-
isation; it exposes the under-funding of essential serv-
ices and lack of attention to known risks. It rouses
division, resistance and struggle, trapping governments
around the world between the demands of politics and
science: the cost of keeping the economy running can
be measured in the daily loss of lives, while the cost of
shutting down entire sectors can be measured in social
unrest and economic collapse. The crisis is producing a
different ‘style of knowing’ (Kwa, 2011) from conven-
tional policymaking, one where the reciprocal relation-
ship between policy inputs and evidence is downplayed
and certainty is performed despite its human cost.
Any data available on the spread of the disease is a
function of authorities’ ability to capture and measure
Covid-19’s effects using the traces it leaves behind.
Even death rates are uncertain (BBC, 2020). The inev-
itable bias towards local and policy-influenced data in
modelling limits what can be understood about the
side-effects of pandemic policy. Should people wear
masks to reduce infections? If the question is being
asked in a South-East Asian country, it is likely the
data will produce the answer ‘yes’, while asking it in
a European country for months produced the answer
‘no’, then shifted towards ‘yes’, the first based at least
partly on culture and the second on broadening data
collection beyond the local (Feng et al., 2020).
Similarly, policymakers can pick and choose evidence
to support or resist lockdown: the US underwent a
wave of policy changes due to people at first perceiving
lockdowns as inevitable based on epidemiological
models and later resisting them based on conspiracy
theories that downplayed the risks of the disease and
emphasised the economic models predicting recession.
There, and around the world, the foregrounding of
either epidemiological or social and economic data
was determined by the presence of a social safety net
and the corresponding economic risks to people’s
livelihoods.
Louise Amoore has asked how we can live with
‘post-Cartesian doubt’ in a time where algorithms are
becoming a primary mode of evidence evaluation. This
denotes a form of doubt that take into account both
the human and the non-human (for example, machine
and algorithmic rationales), as coinciding in ways that
create new forms of uncertainty, ‘opening onto an
undecidable future, where one is permitted to ask
new questions on the political landscape’ (Amoore,
2019: 149). Amoore quotes physicist Richard
Feynman: ‘Permit us to question, to doubt, to not be
sure. . . it is possible to live and not to know’ (Amoore,
2019: 149). Her analysis of the Challenger shuttle disas-
ter unpacks how authorities’ decision-making on ques-
tions of life and death is based on percentages at each
step of the process, rather than binaries. Yet the pro-
cess of feeding unstable conclusions into authoritative
decision-making disguises uncertainty as fact, produc-
ing binary outputs that paper over the reality of risk.
To answer Amoore’s question as to how we can
work with uncertainty as a feature rather than a bug,
we may turn to the possibility of an ethics of care. First
explored by Gilligan (1977), an ethics of care is an
answer to the frequent lack of space for individual or
group needs and idiosyncracies in theories of justice. It
‘draws attention to problems of detachment or aban-
donment and holds up an ideal of attention and
response to need’ (Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988: 225).
Like Amoore’s idea of post-Cartesian doubt, an ethics
of care is embodied: it takes into account what can be
known of the person within the system and considers
how this should shape what can, or should be done to
resolve problems. It also visualises people as collectives,
bound by responsibility for others, rather than agents
rationally obeying predictable incentives. For instance,
practicing an ethics of care in relation to data on the
pandemic might involve actively seeking alternative
sources of data on who are, or who become, invisible
to official data collection under conditions of duress,
and to how their behaviour responds to the needs of
others as well as their own – migrant workers, the
undocumented, the elderly in care homes and their
families being some of those in the case of Covid-19.
In the field of technology, feminist scholars have long
pointed out the ‘false binary between emotion and
reason’ (D’Ignazio and Klein, 2020: 77). They excoriate
‘Big Dick data projects’ which ‘ignore context, fetishize
size, and inflate their technical and scientific
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capabilities’ (p. 153). These disagreements about what
constitutes reason and truth and how to know if a
response to a problem is the correct one are brought
into sharp relief by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Uncertainty has been at the heart of social policy
during the pandemic. As well as perceived risk, actual
risk of infection is influenced by people’s social and
economic situation. Both access to testing and expo-
sure to the disease are correlated with socioeconomic
status, occupation, location, age and many other fac-
tors across different countries including governmental
economic priorities, national policy on information,
and even the internal moderation policies of technology
giants. The platform economy has been a less visible
but globally involved actor in the pandemic, as social
media algorithms first allowed misinformation to
spread like wildfire and later were tamed by their pro-
prietors to impose restrictions on how widely informa-
tion could be shared, and what counted as reliable.
These competing truths warn that ‘the data’ on
Covid-19 does not exist. Instead the pandemic has
been characterised by emerging bodies of evidence
which are being continually captured, shaped and
reproduced in response to domestic policy needs, but
which are inevitably replaced by other bodies of evi-
dence, sometimes very fast. Examples include the
research on the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine as a
treatment for the disease (White, 2020) or a single
expert’s brief reversal of the WHO’s position on
asymptomatic transmission during early June
(Guardian, 2020d). These bodies of evidence reflect
underlying causal factors which can be understood
using ground truth from social scientific inquiry, but
this is a separate process from that of governing.
Meanwhile, public discourse has skewed policy and
research priorities (as occurred with the hydroxychlor-
oquine hype in the US), causing further disruption of
the ideal research-to-policy flow of information.
All these interacting forces create a situation where
data, as an essential component of pandemic-related
governmentality, becomes a reflection of the needs of
policy, not the other way around. In some countries, a
growing consensus on child infections and transmission
(The New York Times, 2020) leads government to sus-
pend reopening schools, while in others the authorities
declare themselves convinced there is no risk of child-
to-adult transmission. We see economically convenient
data sometimes trumping inconvenient data, and that
once a policy such as reopening schools or allowing
public gatherings is put in motion it is easier to turn
it into an experiment and watch what happens next,
than to reverse it if new evidence emerges from other
countries.
Real-time science is not usually on view to the
public: people are used to seeing, as described by
Rubino (2000: 502), the ‘idealised view of science as
the vessel of certainty [that] holds out the promise of
power: power over nature and power over our fellow
human beings’. Instead the pandemic has revealed the
scientific method in all its sociotechnical, Latourian
chaos (Latour, 1987), where competing claims to
truth clamour for attention and policymakers and
their advisors must somehow convey certainty based
on continually iterating knowledge.
It matters very much, however, what kind of process
authorities follow when they learn from the data avail-
able. There is more to this collision between uncertain-
ty and urgency than tradeoffs between economic and
social policy. Where the rhetoric of certainty, usually
an asset in politics, is continually undermined by
changing knowledge and events, a policy that seems
unassailable one week may turn out to pose unaccept-
able risks the next. How to govern with and through
data in this information environment is a moral chal-
lenge that many authorities are not meeting. UK prime
minister Johnson’s initial attempt at a herd immunity
policy, warning that ‘Many families, many more fam-
ilies, are going to lose loved ones before their time’
while declining to restrict public gatherings
(Guardian, 2020b) and US president Trump’s state-
ment that the US would be ‘doing well if it could
hold the number of deaths down to 100,000’ (CNN,
2020a) are examples of the real-time creation of
policy-based evidence. These two statements are per-
formative in that they determine the way evidence
will be gathered and data will be read. First, 100,000
US deaths become a desirable target (after previous
official best-case scenarios of 50,000 and then 75,000
(CNN, 2020b)), and it becomes permissible to gather
data in ways that will shape the number of fatalities to
fit with that total (for example by counting, or not
counting, deaths of the elderly in care homes or youn-
ger people outside hospitals). Second, by referencing
particular epidemiological forecasts the statements
reify those models’ predictions, despite their doubtful
and evolving nature. This makes setting a political
boundary for how many may die (not how many will
die) an act of necropolitics (Mbembe, 2001) – an ori-
enting of state power and policy to shape the mortality
of a target group or population – that cites data and
models as if they, rather than policymakers’ use of
them, determined the risk to life. This kind of claim
to political certainty can even be a weapon: In India,
early in the pandemic the authorities oriented their test-
ing resources towards particular Muslim groups in
order to create a dataset showing they were a main
source of infection (AlJazeera, 2020).
The overlap between political control and disease
control in many countries has created governmental
openness to technological solutions to the pandemic,
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and as a result building the capacity to measure and
track have often been emphasised over the ability to
understand exactly what has to be measured and
tracked. The pandemic has so far put public authorities
at the mercy of vendors piling in to sell repackaged
applications as Covid-relevant technologies: examples
include glasses that assess people’s body temperature
and can link to facial recognition systems to track
anyone with a fever (Newsweek, 2020), but which
focus attention away from the majority of people
believed to be asymptomatic, or the proposed sewage-
testing system that indicates when people in a neigh-
bourhood are infected and about to get sick (Peccia
et al., 2020) and which, the authors note, is ‘is partic-
ularly useful for low and middle-income countries’ (p.
6). In contrast an ethics of care might focus propor-
tionally more resources on preventing than on tracking
infection, and in order to direct those resources might
look at how people are represented by data in order to
understand how data can be improved to prevent the
spread of disease. Many medical specialists, public
health experts and scholars in governance-related dis-
ciplines have taken on the task of explaining where
evidence is missing, where data is misreported or mis-
interpreted, and where certainty is unwarranted. These
specialists start from the same insights as Fotopoulou,
when she observes that ‘data practices are material and
embodied, as they involve human labour and power
relations’ (Fotopoulou, 2019: 3), and that to under-
stand ‘the data’, we need to understand both the
observer and the observed.
If, using Fotopoulou’s logic, we look at the gaps and
uncertainties in the data being used to track the pan-
demic, we see they map onto the groups that are often
subjects of inquiry in both feminist theory and the
ethics of care. Women, whose labour is more often
invisible and informal; prisoners; the elderly, who live
largely out of sight of the powerful; low-income work-
ers in hard and dangerous jobs; migrants; the homeless;
those who are sick; those who work in hospitals,
schools, shops and factories, driving taxies and deliv-
ering food. These are people who either cannot get out
of the way of the pandemic, or who are not permitted
to because their work is too essential. These groups
embody the uncertainty of pandemic data through
their informal or invisible labour and their absence
from the economic and healthcare maps. Those with
responsibilities of care and the recipients of that care
form important chains of transmission of the pandem-
ic, but the groups involved exist on the margins of data
collection. Depending on the country many are undoc-
umented or unregistered, working informally, or invis-
ible in care homes, camps or prisons. Many of the most
vulnerable are minorities, for intersecting reasons
including discrimination in the labour market, limited
access to healthcare and monitoring, lack of access to
safety in all dimensions. The poor and marginalised are
not allowed or are unable to follow the rules: they do
not control their hours of work, how they travel, their
ability to wash their hands, their ability to self-isolate.
They are exposed to pesticides and smog, they are
evicted, deported or imprisoned more readily, and if
they make it to hospital, they are less likely to be
believed by doctors (Institute of Medicine (US), 2003).
The uncertainty of the picture data provides, and
particularly the new, born-digital sources of data, has
always been proportional to the status and power of
those it describes. Worldwide, ground truth on issues of
economic wealth, public health, and even spatial loca-
tion is more true for some than others. This is because
more, and different, data is collected on some than
others (Dalton et al., 2016). It was not until it
became apparent that ethnic minorities in the UK
were dying of Covid-19 at disproportionately higher
rates than the white majority that it was proposed
that death certificates note ethnicity (Khan, 2020) – a
process comparable to the glacial policy shift in the US
toward officially documenting the killing of black and
minority ethnic people by law enforcement (Reuters,
2018).
These unequal dynamics of data collection mean
that the sources of uncertainty and missing data are
often particular groups: those whose selves – or
whose labour – are invisible or underpriced and
whose autonomy and visibility is limited by the same
structures that allow others to self-isolate and ‘flatten
the curve’ of the disease. This has implications for tech-
nical measures proposed to ‘solve’ the pandemic
through data, such as tracking apps. Like epidemiolog-
ical data, app data on contacts and infections is depen-
dent on a web of other datasets, on the ability to
measure accurately, and even on the ability to define
what should be measured (BBC, 2020). ‘If only the
virus would spread in ways that can be detected using
the app’ (Babones, 2020), and submit to the technolo-
gy, the job of policy would be significantly easier.
When a group of technical and business experts
(Oliver et al., 2020) explain the various ways in which
mobile phone data can track people as groups and
individuals to help authorities understand people’s
movements and behaviour, the differences in ground
truth, as well as the politics of data, become salient.
The ‘truth’ data can provide is only as good as the
authorities’ political will to use it – if a government
uses aggregated data to identify gatherings where infec-
tion may occur, it may choose to identify gatherings on
a political rather than a public health basis (AFP,
2020), rendering the data meaningless as a tool for pre-
vention. Similarly, if mobile-based contact tracing is
used to substitute for more costly but more accurate
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human contact tracing which asks people about the
nature and detail of their contact with others, blunt
proxies for ground truth on location, interactions
with others, and daily activities become the guide for
behavioural insights and risk perception (Babones,
2020). The rational subject is the enemy of public
health: apps that read location rather than behaviour
give the illusion that people can choose how they mit-
igate the risk of infection, and in turn, the potential for
blaming those who do not, or cannot, behave
accordingly.
In contrast, an ethics of care has the advantage of
centring the stochastic reality of behaviour – the way in
which less-visible groups also tend to be those who
conform less to the norms of behaviour on which
data analytics are predicated. Migrant workers make
choices based on transnational rather than local needs;
people will disobey rules and expose themselves to
infection in order to care for sick family members; ref-
ugees will continue to travel towards places with higher
rates of infection due to the pressure of risk and vio-
lence. Realities such as these do not fit with behaviou-
ral modelling and will make nudging strategies by
policymakers ineffectual, so that an ethics of care
that takes into account the embodied nature of risk
and decision-making may also challenge policy to rec-
oncile normative and situated modes of knowing. Such
a process would align with de Ridder’s argument (2014)
that some forms of scientific knowledge are inherently
collective and can only be built through iterative pro-
cesses of discovery and structured communication
amongst experts. Similarly, the kind of policy knowl-
edge that can adequately answer a pandemic cannot be
extracted from a single scientific perspective, by ‘trust-
ing the science’. Instead it must be continually adjusted:
the process of turning knowledge into policy must be
structured so that it can be pushed off balance by evi-
dence of what was previously invisible.
There is not only a moral reason to take account of
different situatedness and needs, and to think across
national and economic contexts, there is a very practi-
cal one too. From the standpoint of those who are, or
who are rendered, most vulnerable to the pandemic, a
policy position that attempts only to balance general
loss of life with economic pressures is an existential
threat. From the broader societal perspective, however,
it also threatens our ability as a world to combat the
pandemic. If policy responses around the world cannot
take account of the vulnerability of groups or response
systems, policymakers are blinded to the true course of
the pandemic and cannot combat it effectively. If the
virus lives on amongst the poor and marginalised,
everyone on earth is at risk.
A perspective that centres care as an awareness of
embodied individual experience and needs, in contrast,
separates out the value of human life from economic
value (Eubanks, 2018). It implies a mode of risk evalu-
ation informed by kindness and inclusivity. Such a per-
spective values all lives equally (something that has
become genuinely controversial during the pandemic)
rather than calculating life-years of potential economic
activity or proposing that the elderly sacrifice their lives
for the stock market (Guardian, 2020a). Instead of a
binary of control/loss of control, it starts from the prac-
tice of medical decision-making, where not only knowl-
edge but communication and consent are required for
action. Angela Merkel’s March speech to the German
people (dw.com, 2020) stands out as an example of a
leader calling on an ethics of care to support and legit-
imise science-based policy: she stressed that ‘we are a
community in which every life and every person counts’,
and that ‘consideration for one another’ is the way
through a pandemic where scientific knowledge will
continually fall short. Merkel emphasised explanation
and transparency, and noted that policy understanding
was evolving and would change.
An ethics of care demands that science-based policy
reorient regularly from the notion of the majority to
that of the collective. Seeing people and groups rather
than populations offers more possibilities for taking
particular vulnerabilities into account, and thus for
avoiding new clusters of infection. Orienting data col-
lection and attention to how the majority is composed
of minorities – to the idea of a superdiverse social
world (Meissner and Vertovec, 2015) – means orienting
towards the experiences of children, the elderly and the
sick, to different ethnic, religious and gendered normal-
ities, to the economically disadvantaged and the social-
ly excluded. This in turn makes possible more detailed
understandings that can explain and inform far better
than data about the illusory majority at the centre of
the normal curve. If authorities decenter the idea of
rational, or predicted, behaviour, along with the idea
that authorities should seek to nudge and manipulate
rather than inform and persuade, this may also have
the effect of bringing policy and its discourses closer to
the lived reality of the pandemic, and in doing so
increase epistemic trust (Ioannidis, 2020). Statistical
normality is abnormal – it is the minority position.
There is no ‘herd’, only a mosaic of different vulner-
abilities. Until policy analysts can take this into
account methodologically, and orient toward a care
perspective, we remain at risk from the domestic
unknown.
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